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The Right Not To Endorse Gay Rights:
A Reply to Sunstein
CRAIG M. BRADLEY*
In his lecture and article Homosexuality and the Constitution,' Professor
Sunstein advances the following argument: In Bowers v. Hardwick2 the
Supreme Court rejected the due process/privacy rationale as a ground for
extending constitutional protection to homosexuals and homosexual acts.
However, Bowers, limited by its facts to a statute that forbade the act of
sodomy, did not answer the question of whether laws that disadvantage
someone because of that person's homosexual orientation may be constitution-
ally defective.
Although a due process/privacy attack on "homosexual orientation" laws is
not technically foreclosed by Bowers, Sunstein argues persuasively that it is
likely to be unsuccessful in light of Bowers. He suggests that the Equal
Protection Clause, designed as an "attack on traditions"3 rather than a
reflection of them, is the most "promising source of new constitutional
doctrine," and one that is more likely to lead to a successful outcome for
homosexual plaintiffs.4
Sunstein points out, however, that if the argument for striking down certain
restrictions on homosexuals-such as the bans on homosexuals in the military
and on homosexual marriages-is that such bans are "irrational," then such
claims are likely to be unsuccessful, given the Supreme Court's proclivity to
uphold legislative enactments against claims of irrationality.'
Although Sunstein believes that "discrimination against homosexuals should
be subject to strict scrutiny,"6 he acknowledges that the Supreme Court, after
Bowers, is unlikely to accept this argument. Thus, Sunstein suggests a way to
advance an argument for constitutional protection for homosexuals that is
"buil[t] more narrowly on existing law."7
Sunstein concludes that discrimination against homosexuals, such as the
disallowance of homosexual marriages, should be subject to intermediate
scrutiny similar to discrimination on the basis of sex. He acknowledges,
* Louis B. Calamaras Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. I wish
to thank Pat Baude, Dan Conkle, Lynne Henderson, Andrew Koppelman, Bill Popkin, and Susan
Williams for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1 (1994).
2. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
3. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 3.
4. Id.
5. See id. at 4-5. Sunstein explains, for example, that a ban on homosexual marriages could be
justified on the ground that the ban is aimed at "restricting the benefits of marriage to relations that
involve children." Id. at 6. He correctly observes that such arguments, while not very convincing, "could
survive rationality review." Id. He concludes, correctly in my view, that "probably it can be said that
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation alone-unaccompanied by conduct-ought to be
invalidated on rationality grounds." Id. at 5.
6. Id. at 9.
7. Id.
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however, that sex discrimination does not appear on the face of such a ban
since the state even-handedly forbids everyone, male and female, from
marrying a person of the same sex.8 Consequently, he acknowledges that
"under current law ... [this] argument gets nowhere." 9
Adopting an argument that was originally made by Andrew Koppelman, l°
Sunstein argues that a ban on homosexual marriages is a form of discrimina-
tion against women-perpetuating their status as "second-class citizens[].""1
The reasoning behind this argument is sophisticated and interesting.
Nevertheless, as I shall argue, it is not much more convincing as a legal
argument than the other arguments for homosexual rights that have already
been advanced and defeated. It will be particularly ineffective as to the ban
on homosexual marriages.
The argument analogizes the ban on homosexual marriages to the ban on
interracial marriages struck down by the Supreme Court in Loving v.
Virginia." In Loving, the Supreme Court struck down the Virginia anti-
miscegenation statute because it "rest[ed] solely upon distinctions drawn
according to race" and served no other legitimate state objective. 3 The Court
rejected the argument that, since the statute even-handedly forbade blacks and
whites from marrying members of the other race, it was not discriminatory
8. Id. at 18-19.
9. Id Andrew Koppelman, in his latest paper, discussed infra at text accompanying note 19,
refuses to make this concession, arguing that, since these statutes make gender relevant (because men
are prohibited from doing that which women may do (i.e., marrying men)), they are, by definition,
discriminatory on the basis of gender, unlike the gender-neutral statute in a case such as Personnel
Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). See Koppelman, infra note 19, (manuscript at 2). Thus,
they should be subjected to intermediate scrutiny and struck down under current equal protection
principles. E.g., id. at 26-27. Koppelman's position has semantic appeal, but is, at bottom, a.
disagreement with current law.
In Bowers, the Court assumed that it was dealing with a statute that was limited to prohibiting
homosexual sodomy (and thus made the gender of the participants relevant to the application of the
statute). Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188 n.2. Nevertheless, it upheld the statute without applying intermediate
scrutiny. Thus, the Court was unwilling to consider laws that single out homosexual behavior for
prohibition as constitutionally recognized "discrimination on the basis of gender." A statute that
prohibits men from using the ladies room (and vice versa) in public buildings would also make gender
relevant but would not require heightened scrutiny. In every case in which the Court has granted
intermediate scrutinythe plaintiff has claimed to be disadvantaged vis d vis the opposite sex. Eg., Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding invalid a state statute that barred only men under the age of 21
from purchasing beer). Here, by contrast, both sexes have been subjected to mirror image restrictions.
If only males, but not females, were forbidden from marrying members of the same sex, then we would
have a case of gender discrimination that should be subjected to intermediate scrutiny and struck down
under current law. But if males and females are equally prohibited from marrying or having sex with
their own gender, or using the restroom of the other gender, these statutes should not be subject to
intermediate scrutiny. In any event, as I shall argue, infra at text accompanying notes 29-36, a statute
forbidding same-sex marriages can also survive intermediate scrutiny.
10. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 16 (citing Koppelman, The Miscegenation Analogy, 98 YALE LJ. 145,
147 (1988)); see also Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L
REV. 187, 218-32 (arguing that "condemnation of homosexuality seeks to preserve the social meaning
of gender," but basing her argument on "heterosexism"-discrimination against homosexuals as such).
I agree with Sunstein that this argument is effectively foreclosed by Bowers.
11. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 13.
12. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
13. Id. at 11.
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because the obvious purpose of the statute was to "maintain White
Supremacy."' 4 That is, as Sunstein summarizes Loving:
[TJhe ban [was] transparently an effort to keep the races separate and, by
so doing, to maintain the form and the conception of racial difference that
are indispensable to White Supremacy. Viewed in its context-in light of
its actual motivations and its actual effects-the ban was thus part of a
system of racial caste.'
Sunstein then argues that, just as the miscegenation ban was an effort to
maintain white supremacy, so too the ban on homosexual marriages (and on
homosexual intercourse outside of marriage) may be seen as an attempt to
maintain male supremacy. Since homosexual intercourse can involve men
acting "like women" (i.e., playing a passive role in sexual intercourse), 6 it
tends to blur the popular conception of men as "active in social and sexual
arenas"17 and consequently to defeat male supremacy. As such, bans on
homosexual marriages and homosexual behavior, by perpetuating notions of
male supremacy, discriminate against women in the same way that the
miscegenation ban in Loving discriminated against blacks. 8
In his recent paper, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gays Is Sex
Discrimination,9 Andrew Koppelman discusses this argument in great detail.
He makes a very convincing case that such motivation may well be one factor
that underlies the extreme repugnance and repression with which society has
traditionally treated homosexuals and homosexual conduct.
So far, Sunstein (and Koppelman) have stated their arguments effectively.
They have unpacked laws and practices that discriminate against homosexuals
and have shown that an underlying motivation for those laws may be similar
to the underlying motivation for the miscegenation law struck down in Loving.
It would thus seem to follow that laws discriminating against homosexuals
should be evaluated under intermediate scrutiny and struck down as
unjustifiable discrimination against women.
However, Sunstein has promised us not just a theoretical argument, but a
legal strategy that is stronger than either the due process argument or the
strict scrutiny argument, both of which, Sunstein concedes, appear to be
losing approaches after Bowers.20 But in order to succeed in an intermediate
scrutiny/sex discrimination argument, the plaintiff must show more than that
one possible, subconscious motive for the statute in question is discrimination
14. Id.
15. Sunstein, supra note I, at 18 (emphasis added).
16. Id. at21.
17. Id. at 22.
18. Id. at20.
19. Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination,
69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 197 (1994).
20. "This is not merely a philosophical or sociological observation. It is highly relevant to the legal
argument. It suggests that, like the ban on racial intermarriage, the ban on same-sex marriages may well
be doomed by a constitutionally illegitimate purpose." Sunstein, supra note I, at 21.
1994]
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on the basis of sex2 or that such is its effect.22 Rather, "classifications by
gender" will be upheld if they "serve important governmental objectives" and
are "substantially related to achievement of those objectives. 23 That is, even
if it is assumed that this statute embodies gender discrimination, 24 it still
must be shown that there is no (or no significant) justification for the statute
that serves important and legitimate government objectives and is substantially
related to those objectives.
The analogy to Loving breaks down here. As noted, the Supreme Court
found in Loving that "[tihere can be no question but that Virginia's miscege-
nation statutes rest solely upon [illegitimate] distinctions drawn according to
race."25 Indeed, if we could have injected the Virginia legislators with truth
serum and asked them why they passed this statute, they would surely have
admitted that this was their motivation.26
By contrast, the Georgia legislators responsible for the sodomy statute in
Bowers, and authors of statutes that forbid same-sex marriages would deny,
truthfully and adamantly, that they had any purpose to discriminate against
21. See, eg., Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979):
"Discriminatory purpose," however, implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness
of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker, in this case a state legislature, selected or
reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part "because of," not merely "in spite of,"
its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.
Id. at 279 (citation omitted). Obviously, a motive of which the legislators themselves are unaware is
going to pose an even weaker challenge than a partial motive. See also, Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21 (1977) (noting that the burden of proving a
discriminatory purpose in facially neutral government decisions lies with the party who is challenging
those decisions).
22. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 256. In Feeney, a statute granting hiring preferences to veterans had the
effect of making it much more difficult for women to get civil service jobs. Nevertheless, the Court
upheld the preference on the ground that it was facially neutral and did not "reflecti] invidious gender-
based discrimination." Id. at 274. As noted before, I am assuming that a ban on homosexual marriages
is "gender neutral" on its face, even though it makes gender relevant in a sense that the statute in
Feeney did not See supra text accompanying notes 8-9. Thus, my "intermediate scrutiny" argument
becomes relevant only in reference to the claimed de facto discrimination against women, not to
Koppelman's argument, that a ban on homosexual marriages is facially discriminatory in that it forbids
men from doing that which women may do, that is, marrying men. See supra note 9.
23. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
24. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
25. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (emphasis added).
26. As Koppelman observes:
Loving did not fully explain how the prohibition of interracial marriage was linked to white
supremacy, but the existence of the linkage should have been clear to most Americans. Before
abolition, the connection was clear- as one Virginia jury foreman put it in 1833, "the law was
made to preserve the distinction which should exist between our two kinds of population, and
to protect the whites in the possession of their superiority." Kingsley Davis observes that laws
against interracial marriage are important for the continued functioning of a caste society.
"Such laws indicate one thing: that the racial integrity of the upper caste is to be strictly
maintained, to the degree that all persons of mixed racial qualities shall be placed unequivocal-
ly in the lower of the two castes."
Koppelman, supra note 19, (manuscript at 30) (footnote omitted) (quoting Kingsley Davis,
Intermarriage in Caste Societies, 43 AM ANTHROPOLOGIST (n.s.) 376, 389 (1941)).
Since interracial marriage led, in its offspring, to a literal blurring of the distinction between the races,
it is much easier to attribute a "racial discrimination" motive to the legislature than in the case of
homosexual marriages, which do not seem to blur the distinctions between the sexes much more than
homosexuality itself does.
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women. They would, in fact, be astonished by such a suggestion.2 7 While
such a subconscious motivation may have been one of a number of reasons
behind the legislators' action, it likely was neither their conscious nor their
primary purpose. In any event, it is highly unlikely that it could be proven to
be such a purpose.28
What then is the motivation for such statutes? Surely the overwhelming
response given by the legislators to such a question would be that it was
simply to prevent or discourage homosexual behavior which has always been,
as the Bible, Blackstone, and many other authorities adumbrate, "morally
wrong." 9 This argument was a winning strategy in Bowers, where the Court
recognized the judgment that sodomy was immoral as an acceptable basis for
the sodomy statute.30
But Bowers was only applying the "rational basis" test. If a state still
criminalizes sodomy, then a prohibition against homosexual marriage can
easily be upheld, under either rational basis or intermediate scrutiny, as part
and parcel of a general state policy of forbidding homosexual behavior.
Nevertheless, in the twenty-seven states that no longer criminalize sodomy, 3'
under intermediate scrutiny, a law banning homosexual marriage does not
seem substantially related to the goal of preventing people from engaging in
27. "A gap in the analogy to Loving is that the connection between the discriminatory classification
(sex) and the harm (reinforcing gender stereotypes) is... hard to connect with legislative motivations.
Judges may find it difficult to understand how denying two gay men the right to marry is driven by an
ideology that oppresses straight women." William Eskridge, A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA.
L REV. 1419, 1509-10 (1993).
28. Accord Bray v. Alexandria Women's Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993). In holding that the goal of
preventing abortion does not qualify as invidious discrimination against women for the purposes of the
civil rights statutes, the Court noted that, to show such discrimination, plaintiffs must show "a purpose
that focuses upon women by reason of their sex .... The record in this case does not indicate that
petitioners' demonstrations are motivated by a purpose (malevolent or benign) directed specifically at
women as a class ... ." Id. at 759 (emphasis in original). Obviously, statutes aimed at preventing
homosexual behavior or same-sex marriages are aimed far less at women as a class than are anti-
abortion protests.
29. DERRCK S. BAILEY, HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE WEsTERN CHRISTIAN TADITON ix (1975).
Bailey states:
The Church taught and people universally believed, on what was held to be excellent authority,
that homosexual practices had brought a terrible Divine vengeance upon the city of Sodom,
and that repetition of such "offences against nature" had from time to time provoked similar
visitations in the form of earthquake and famine.
Id. Bailey goes on to cast doubt on the popular understanding of the biblical story of Sodom. Id. at 1-28.
However, it is not the accuracy of the tradition, but the fact that it exists, that concerns us in this
context. As Bailey notes, "[I]t is not as if, throughout the last two millennia, reluctant legislatures had
been forced by the spiritual authority to enact laws and to prescribe iunishments which they secretly
detested." Id. at ix.
30. The Bowers Court stated:
Even if the conduct at issue here is not a fundamental right, respondent asserts that there must
be a rational basis for the law and that there is none in this case other than the presumed belief
of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unaccep.t-
able. This is said to be an inadequate rationale to support the law. The law, however, is
constantly based on notions of morality .... []espondent... insists that majority sentiments
about the morality of homosexuality should be declared inadequate. We do not agree ....
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (emphasis added).
31. See Jane Gross, After a Ruling Hawaii Weighs Gay Marriages, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1994, at
Al, B8 (noting that in 23 states, sodomy remains a criminal act).
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morally repugnant activity, since the law says nothing about, and will not
substantially discourage, engaging in homosexual acts as such.
But, even the dullest legislator could have figured this one out in advance.
Therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that a ban on homosexual marriages was
designed to serve some function in addition to discouraging sodomy. The most
obvious explanation is that, since practicing homosexuals engage, by
definition, in the sort of morally repugnant behavior that was the subject of
the Georgia sodomy statute, no legislator would want to give legal recognition
to a relationship as to which such behavior would seem to be the sine qua
non.32 If a refusal to give such recognition to homosexual relationships is
regarded as a legitimate governmental objective, and if the law is substantially
related to achieving that objective, then the law will survive intermediate
scrutiny, notwithstanding an incidental effect that it may have on societal
attitudes toward women.33
A ban on same-sex marriages is not perfectly tailored to further the
governmental interest in not giving homosexual relationships legal recognition
since it forbids people of the same sex from entering into a legally recognized
"marriage" regardless of their sexual proclivities (or lack of same). 34 It is,
however, surely close enough to the mark to stand up to the "substantial
relationship" test of intermediate scrutiny. That is, since virtually all
applicants for same-sex marriages will be homosexuals, forbidding such
marriages is a proxy for withholding legal recognition for homosexual
relationships and the conduct that they entail. 35 Indeed, if same-sex marriages
were recognized as legal, the participants would immediately use that legal
recognition to claim further legal entitlements such as social security benefits,
pension benefits, and "family" health insurance coverage. The legislature
certainly has a legitimate concern about such fiscal matters as these.36
If society can express its moral repugnance for homosexual activity by
making sodomy a crime, as Georgia did in Bowers, so too can it withhold
legal recognition from a relationship which is very likely to be founded upon
32. Cf Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (finding constitutional significance in a state's
implicit "authorization" of certain practices). In Reitman, improper state action was found in a state
constitutional provision that declared the right of people to rent real property to whomever they chose,
thus allowing landlords to discriminate on the basis of race.
33. I admit that my argument as to this point-that there is a legitimate governmental objective that
is served by this statute-is influenced by my views of the initial argument-that the case for treating
a same-sex marriage statute as discrimination against women is weak. If all women, as opposed only
to homosexual women, were more obviously disadvantaged by the law in question, then the legislative
justification of not wanting to endorse homosexual relationships might have less force.
34. For a historical and cross-cultural discussion of same-sex marriages, see Eskridge, supra note
27, at 1426.
35. Similarly, denying various benefits to heterosexual couples who cohabitate would seem to be
within the legislature's power-justified as an effort to encourage marriage. See, e.g., Sam H. Verhovek,
Texas Capital Ends Benefits for Partners, N.Y. TIMEs, May 9, 1994, at A8.
36. In Hawaii, the legislature seems to be prepared to grant homosexuals the financial benefits of
marriage so long as it is not required to deem their partnership a "marriage" under Hawaii law. Gross,
supra note 31, at 18.
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such activity.37 It is not enough to argue, as Sunstein does, that such a law
has the effect or subconscious motivation of discriminating against women.
The legislature can point to another purpose-discrimination against
homosexuals-as the obvious, and Supreme Court-endorsed, purpose for the
law.38 Consequently, Sunstein's approach, which hides behind the skirts of
a "discrimination against women" argument, is less likely to succeed than an
approach which forthrightly takes on discrimination against homosexuals as
constitutionally unacceptable per se.
Some states might make the alternative argument that marriage is for the
purpose of procreation and the rearing of children and that, while marriage is
obviously not limited to people who plan to procreate, it is acceptable to
broadly limit marriage to male-female relationships that generally have that
potential. Interestingly, Loving itself lends support to the constitutional
validity of such a claim, noting that "[m]arriage is one of the 'basic civil
rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival. ' 39 In what
sense is marriage "fundamental to our very existence and survival"? People
are, after all, perfectly capable of reproducing without the benefit of clergy.
The Supreme Court must have been recognizing the fundamentality of
marriage as an efficacious, and societally encouraged, means of both
producing and rearing offspring.4"
Since encouragement of heterosexual marriage as a "fundamental"
institution would seem to be an "important governmental objective," and since
forbidding people from marrying people with whom reproduction is impos-
sible obviously serves this objective, it follows that a statute that forbids
homosexual marriages will survive intermediate scrutiny. This would be true
even if we consider the ban on homosexual marriages to be discrimination on
the basis of gender.
But this argument is weakened by the fact that legislatures act in various
other ways to discourage procreation. For example, the legislature may set
limits on welfare payments for second children, may allow non-procreative
marriages to occur, and may support the bearing and rearing of children out
37. Several courts of appeals have adopted this line of reasoning. E.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense
Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
38. See Bray v. Alexandria Women's Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 60-61 (1993) (noting that a goal of
discouraging abortion does not qualify as an invidiously discriminatory animus toward women).
39. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (emphasis added).
40. For example, the Catholic Church clearly states such a concern is the basis for its opposition
to homosexual conduct, and, by extension, to homosexual marriage:
The bodily differences between a man and a woman given by God in His creative act are the
physical means of expressing a familial communion ofpersons. Further, the bodily expression
of love serves life, new life, because God willed that our love be fruitfil as His love is fruitful.
Homosexual activity can never be a physical expression of familial love. Familial love is
precisely the union of a man and woman in a total self-donation, which is physically expressed
through their masculine and feminine bodies. Since it is impossible for two men (or two
women) to give themselves physically to one another, any attempted union between them
ceases to be a gift. It becomes a using of each other, or, at least, a using of each others' bodies.
RiCHARD M. HOGAN & JOHN M. LEVOIR, COVENANT OF LOVE: POPE JOHN PAUL II ON SEXUALITY,
MARRIAGE, AND FAMILY IN THE MODERN WORLD 57 (1985) (emphasis in original). Consistent with this
reasoning, the Church also condemns extra-marital sex, birth control devices, and abortion. Id. at 49-61.
1994]
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of wedlock. Thus, legislatures are not likely to be quite as single-minded in
pursuing the "encouraging procreation" goal, as in pursuing the "discrimina-
tion against homosexuals" goal. Hence, they may have a hard time proving
that encouraging procreation really was their purpose. Nevertheless, this
argument has the obvious advantage of not being automatically invalidated if
Bowers is overruled. By contrast, the earlier legislative justification that
forthrightly endorses discrimination against homosexuals as the legislature's
purpose will necessarily fail if the courts should decide that such a purpose
is illegitimate.4
The above arguments will work when the government tries to ban
homosexual marriages. Neither of the above arguments will succeed, however,
if a government is trying to enforce a ban on homosexuals in the military or
as elementary school teachers. Obviously, such bans have nothing to do with
encouraging procreation. Moreover, unlike the homosexual marriage
applicants, the plaintiffs fighting these bans are not asking for a legal
imprimatur on homosexual relationships or activities. Instead, they claim, "our
homosexuality is irrelevant to the job in question." Assuming they can
establish this claim, and as long as they do not argue that admission to the
military or the school system also confers some right to engage in homosexual
conduct, they are correct.
In these situations, if the plaintiffs obtain "intermediate scrutiny" review by
making the Sunstein/Koppelman argument, they have a better chance of
success in litigation, because it will be hard for the government to show that
the prohibition in question bears a substantial relationship to the legitimate
governmental interest in not endorsing homosexual relationships or in
encouraging procreation (subject to the standing problem discussed below). 2
As the District of Columbia Circuit case of Steffan v. Aspin43 (striking down
the "no homosexuals in the military" policy) illustrates, however, such bans
can also be defeated under the "rational basis" approach of current law-if
rational basis analysis is taken seriously.4
41. Once the underpinning of Bowers is removed, however, it is likely that the "encouraging
procreation" rationale would also fail under intermediate scrutiny.
42. Consistent with the military's "Don't ask, don't tell" policy, it would be appropriate for either
the school or military employer to insist that the potential employee keep his sexual orientation to
himself. Otherwise, a teacher who advocated the "gay lifestyle" to his students, or a male soldier seen
kissing another man on base, would put the employer/government in the position of appearing to
condone behavior which, as discussed in the text, the government considers immoral. Thus, a person-
homosexual or not-cannot be banned from employment because of a fear that he may engage in some
sort of unacceptable conduct, but can be fired if he actually engages in such conduct As discussed in
the text, it is currently constitutional for homosexual behavior to be deemed "illegitimate." To what
extent private homosexual conduct, in gay bars, for example, would justify expulsion of soldiers from
the military under such a nonendorsement rationale, would be a matter to be litigated.
43. 8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 9977 (1994). See Sunstein, supra
note 1, at 4-5.
44. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (applying only the rational basis
standard to strike down the requirement of a special use permit for a group home for the mentally
retarded). The Court held that the requirement rested on "an irrational prejudice against the mentally
retarded" that was not rationally related to any legitimate state interest. Id. at 450. The same can be said,
as did the District of Columbia Circuit panel decision in Steffan, for much discrimination against
homosexuals.
[Vol. 70:29
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There probably is a class of cases where discrimination against homosexuals
could survive rational basis analysis, but not intermediate scrutiny. In these
cases, the Sunstein/Koppelman approach might make a difference. The claim
that having gays in the military, even if they do not engage in homosexual
activity, is "bad for morale" might be such a case. If, however, a court agrees
that discrimination against homosexuals on the job in question is "rational,"
it is unlikely to subscribe to Sunstein's gender discrimination argument.
Another possible problem with Sunstein's argument as a litigation strategy
is that of standing. Since he claims that laws disadvantaging homosexuals
discriminate against women, then a woman should bring the suit. But no
woman would be able to sue for an injury so uncertain and diffuse as, "These
laws tend to maintain male superiority. 45 While homosexual males who
wish to challenge the law can obviously satisfy the "injury in fact" criteri-
on, 6 they will have a difficult time arguing that they have standing to protest
a law whose only improper effect is to discriminate against women.47
Homosexual females would seem to be in the best position to challenge the
law, but even they will encounter the problem that the primary impact of the
law is on male homosexuals, not women, rendering their injury, as women,
too remote.
Finally, the issue of the "immutability" of homosexuality must be
considered. In Frontiero v. Richardson,4" a Supreme Court plurality held that
immutability is a significant factor in determining whether discrimination
based on a given characteristic is subject to heightened scrutiny. Sunstein
argues that immutability alone is not a determining factor,49 since some
immutable characteristics, such as blindness, may be relevant to legitimate
45. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 20-23.
46. See, eg., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1992). In Meinhold v. United
States Dep't of Defense, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23705 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 1994), the court struck down
the discharge of a declared homosexual on equal protection grounds. The court concluded that, absent
actual evidence of homosexual conduct, such a discharge was based on "status or propensity" and was
unconstitutional. Id at *26. Neither the court nor, apparently, the government noted that it is not the
appellee's "status" as a homosexual that is the basis of his discharge but the act of declaring that status.
See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (plurality opinion) (upholding defendant's conviction, not for
"being an alcoholic," but rather for public drunkenness). Meinhold's declaration is critical because it puts
the Navy in the position of having to accept known homosexuals which, it should not be required to
do. See supra note 42.
47. While the homosexual plaintiffs are clearly disadvantaged by such statutes, the "general rule,
as frequently stated by the Court, is that 'one may not claim standing [to] vindicate the constitutional
rights of some third party."' GERALD GUNTHER, CONSITImONAL LAW 1624 (12th ed. 1991). But see
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 499 (1991) (holding that a white defendant may object to the exclusion of
blacks from juries); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (holding that a male defendant may
challenge the exclusion of women from his jury). These cases, which hinge on the notion that a
defendant is entitled to a jury that represents a 'Tair cross-section" of the community, would not seem
directly applicable here. Nor does such a case fit well within the guidelines governing third party
standing. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326 (1992) (holding that a California resident may not
qualify for heightened scrutiny on the ground that a state property tax discourages nonresidents from
moving to California and hence interferes with their right to travel). See generally JOHN E. NOWAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 220 § 2.12(3) (4th ed. 1991).
48. 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). This position was later adopted by a majority in Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Cir., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
49. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 9.
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proscriptions, such as prohibiting the blind from driving. The Court recog-
nized as much in Frontiero, adding the additional qualification that only those
discriminations that "bear[] no relation to ability to perform or contribute to
society" are relevant. 50
Sunstein adds that, even if blacks could take a shot that would turn them
into whites-thus rendering blackness "mutable"--discrimination against
blacks would still be improper. This is surely correct, but it does not refute
the basic point that the Supreme Court was trying to make-those groups
which people choose to belong to and/or can readily change, such as
membership in fraternal organizations or lifestyle preferences, are entitled to
less protection than groups into which people are born, are involuntarily
included, or cannot readily and reasonably change (such as race or sex,
regardless of the technological possibility of changing). "'[L]egal burdens
should bear some relationship to legal responsibility.' 5' Thus, if homosexu-
ality can be shown to be, at least in part, "immutable,"52 the argument for
gay rights will enjoy more success in the courts."
As Sunstein notes at the beginning of his article:
In all likelihood, laws against homosexual orientation and behavior will
soon come to be seen as products of unfounded prejudice and hostility, and
private prejudice and hostility will themselves recede. Courts should play
a limited if perhaps catalytic role in this process, 4
I agree with this sentiment and prediction. In the meantime, the Sunstein/
Koppelman proposal presents potential challengers to laws that discriminate
against homosexuals with no more legal ammunition than they have now in
same-sex marriage cases, and only a little more in other types of cases. I
agree, however, that, in a few cases, that "little more" may be enough.
50. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686. I disagree with John Ely, who has argued that this "relevance"
inquiry has rendered the immutability issue nugatory. JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
T-EORY OF JUDIcIAL REvmw 150 (1980). The goal of any legislation that discriminates against a group
on the basis of a particular characteristic must be "relevant" to that characteristic, immutable or not. But
if the characteristic is immutable, as are the characteristics of gender and illegitimacy that have led to
intermediate scrutiny, it makes sense to scrutinize the legislation more closely-to require a higher
standard of "relevance."
51. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
52. This raises some interesting problems: If homosexuality is not genetically predetermined but,
once established, is difficult or impossible to change, should it be regarded as "immutable"? If it is
implanted in childhood, rather than as a result of a conscious adult decision, like heroin addiction, does
that matter? The precise meaning of "immutable" for legal purposes is beyond the bounds of this
Article.
53. For a detailed and insightful discussion of this issue, see Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation
and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L REV. 503
(1994). Halley argues that, whatever the truth about a genetic predisposition toward homosexuality, it
is not a wise strategy for pro-gay litigants to rely on it. As Halley makes clear, however, the mutability
issue has played a key role in court decisions to date. Id. at 507-16.
54. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 2.
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